Let's talk about Philosophy of Science

Scientific realism and anti-realism offer opposing views about what scientific theories tell us about the world. - Scientific realism: Claims that mature scientific theories aim to give true (or approximately true) descriptions of both observable and unobservable aspects of the world. Under realism, successful theories are taken to track real entities, structures, and causal mechanisms (e.g., electrons, genes, gravitational fields). The usual arguments for realism include the "no miracles" argument: the success and predictive power of science would be a miracle unless theories are at least approximately true (Putnam 1975; Boyd 1984). Realists also appeal to theory continuity: many successful past theories were approximately true in important respects, suggesting current successful theories are too. - Scientific anti-realism: Denies that we should accept theoretical claims about unobservables as literally true. Varieties include instrumentalism (theories are tools for prediction, not descriptions), constructive empiricism (van Fraassen: science aims to produce empirically adequate theories—correct about observables—without commitment to unobservables), and positivist or pragmatist readings. Anti-realists stress past theory change (pessimistic meta-induction): many once-successful theories were later discarded, so success does not guarantee truth. They also emphasize underdetermination: the idea that multiple, empirically equivalent theories can fit the same data, so theory choice does not determine truth about unobservables. Trade-offs and middle positions: - Structural realism: Attempts a compromise by claiming we can know the structure or relations described by theories even if not the nature of unobservable entities (Worrall 1989). - Selective realism: Accepts that some parts of theories (e.g., core mechanisms) are likely true while other parts are revision-prone. - Pragmatic or pluralist views: Emphasize the role of models, practices, and instruments rather than grand metaphysical claims. Key considerations: - Empirical success vs. historical turnover - Observability distinctions (how to draw the line) - The role of explanation, prediction, and intervention in justifying belief References (selection): - Bas van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (1980). - Hilary Putnam, "What Is Realism?" (1975). - Stathis Psillos, Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth (1999). - James Ladyman & Don Ross, Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized (2007). - Richard Boyd, "Scientific Realism" (1984). - W. V. O. Quine and the problem of underdetermination; Worrall on structural realism (1989). In brief: realism affirms that science uncovers truth about a mind-independent world (including unobservables); anti-realism treats theories primarily as instruments for organizing and predicting observations, withholding metaphysical commitment to unobservables.