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Can AI companions actually feel “real”

Can AI Companions Actually Feel “Real”?

Why “Real” Feelings Require Phenomenal Consciousness

Functional Similarity and the Felt Reality of AI Companions

Practical Implications of AI Companions’ “Realness”

Examples Showing How AI Companions Can Feel “Real” Without Having Inner Feelings

Simulated Empathy That Comforts — How It Works and Why It Matters

How Conversational Continuity Creates Real Attachment

Why Expressive Behavior Can Convince — Even Without Inner Feelings

Functional Substitution of Social Support by AI Companions

Appearance vs. Inner Experience — Why AI Can Feel “Real” to Us but Not to It

Why Ethical and Design Safeguards Matter for AI Companions

Why Nagel’s “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” matters

Why cite David J. Chalmers’ The Conscious Mind (1996)

Searle’s “Chinese Room” — Why it Matters for AI Feelings

Unresolved metaphysics of AI consciousness

Nagel’s “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” — The Argument from Subjectivity

Why Chalmers' The Conscious Mind Matters for AI Companions

Searle’s Chinese Room — Why Syntax Isn’t Semantics