Let’s talk about Fear and Trembling by Sren Kierkegaard

Kierkegaard contrasts two orders of understanding: the ethical (universal) and the religious (teleological). Ethical duty is the realm of the universal: moral laws and duties that apply to everyone and can be publicly justified and judged. The teleological suspension of the ethical names a situation in which a person temporarily suspends those universal duties because of a higher, divine purpose (telos). Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice Isaac exemplifies this: he appears to violate the ethical duty not to kill his son, yet he obeys what he understands as God’s command.

Kierkegaard insists this suspension cannot be publicly justified. If Abraham tried to explain his action within the ethical framework, it would make him a murderer; appealing to a general principle would destroy the uniqueness of his relation to God. The decision belongs to the individual’s inward relation with the divine and so is inherently solitary. This solitude produces “fear and trembling”: the anguish of making a paradoxical, non-rational commitment that isolates the chooser from communal norms and public reasoning.

Thus the teleological suspension is not an invitation to reject ethics wholesale, but an account of an existentially singular situation where faith requires a private decision beyond ethical universality — a decision that eludes public vindication and entails profound loneliness (Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling). References: Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling (1843).

Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling objects to Hegelian ethical universalism—the idea that moral truth is found in universal, rational norms embodied in social institutions—by insisting that authentic ethical life can require an absolute, personal relation to God that overrides universal ethics. Using the Abraham story, Kierkegaard argues that Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice Isaac is not a failure of morality but a “teleological suspension of the ethical”: Abraham acts on a direct command from God that suspends the universal ethical duty not to kill.

Key points, briefly:

• Ethical universalism (Hegel): morality is grounded in rational, communal norms; individuals realize freedom by aligning with universal ethical life (Sittlichkeit).
• Kierkegaard’s critique: such universal frameworks cannot account for paradoxical cases where God’s demand places a singular individual in a relation that conflicts with the universal. The highest relation is the individual’s responsibility before God, not the ethical norms of the community.
• Individual responsibility: the “knight of faith” (Abraham) is isolated in relation to the Absolute; this isolation makes the individual solely responsible to God in ways that cannot be mediated by general ethical rules or rational justification.
• Existential consequence: faith is non-rational, passionate, and personal; it requires “fear and trembling” because the individual stands alone before God, responsible for actions that may appear absurd or unjust to the universal moral standpoint.

References: Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling (1843); G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1820) for the theory Kierkegaard opposes.

Fear and Trembling examines the biblical story of Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice Isaac to explore what it means to have faith. Kierkegaard contrasts two ways of relating to moral law and the divine:

• The Ethical vs. The Religious: The ethical (embodied by universal moral duties and social norms) commands that one must not kill. Abraham’s readiness to sacrifice Isaac appears to violate the ethical. Kierkegaard asks how faith can justify a particular individual’s relation to God that suspends the universal ethical.

• The Knight of Faith and the Teleological Suspension of the Ethical: Kierkegaard introduces the “knight of faith,” who trusts God absolutely and acts in relation to the divine particularity. The “teleological suspension of the ethical” is the idea that a higher teleology (God’s purpose) can suspend universal ethical obligations for a particular divine command. Abraham is the paradigmatic knight of faith, paradoxically both a sinner before the ethical and justified before God.

• The Paradox and Subjectivity: Faith is inherently paradoxical and subjective. True faith involves inwardness, passion, and a personal relation to God that cannot be fully justified by reason or publicly verified. Kierkegaard emphasizes the “absurdity” of Abraham’s situation: he believes the impossible (that Isaac will be preserved) while prepared to carry out God’s command.

• Anxiety, Doubt, and the Individual: The book explores existential themes—anxiety, isolation, trust—showing that the single individual stands alone before God. Faith requires a movement beyond rational evidence while remaining intensely personal and responsible.

Why it matters: Fear and Trembling challenges rationalist and ethical frameworks by arguing that the highest relation to the divine may demand a suspension of universal moral norms, and that true faith is a subjective, inward passion that cannot be reduced to objective proof. It’s foundational for existentialist ideas about authenticity, choice, and the limits of reason.

Key passages to read: the “Preliminary Expectoration” (pseudonymous frame), the essay “A” (repetition and faith), and “B” (the knight of faith and the teleological suspension). For secondary reading, see Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript and secondary commentators like Simon D. Critchley or C. Stephen Evans.

Kierkegaard contrasts two existential responses to loss and longing by way of two ideal figures.

• The Knight of Infinite Resignation

  • What he does: He confronts an impossible desire, recognizes that the finite object of his longing cannot be had, and makes a sacred inward renunciation. By a movement of consciousness he gives up the desire forever, preserves the memory and inward relation to the lost object, and attains peace and dignity through this immutable resignation.
  • Key features: existential honesty, permanence of loss, inward sublimation. He accepts the human, ethical order and lives with the sorrowful but noble consequence.

• The Knight of Faith

  • What he does: He makes the same movement of resignation—acknowledging the impossibility and letting go—but then makes a second, paradoxical movement: by virtue of the absurd (i.e., faith that transcends reason and the ethical), he expects to receive the finite back. Without undermining the previous resignation, he trusts that the impossible will be restored through a relation to the Divine.
  • Key features: transcendent hope, paradoxical expectation, personal relation to God. The knight lives in the tension of both resignation and the assurance of a miracle that defies human logic.

Contrast in short

• Resignation = accepting the permanent loss within human possibility; it is inwardly consummated and ends in solemn peace.
• Faith = includes resignation but adds the absurd: the belief that God can and will restore the finite, so the lost becomes present again without violating the ethical resignation. Faith is solitary, paradoxical, and cannot be demonstrated to others.

Reference: Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling (especially the sections on the “two figures” and the “move of resignation” vs. the “move of faith”); see also commentary by Alastair Hannay and the “Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses” for Kierkegaard’s account of faith.

Foundational Existential Themes in Fear and Trembling

Søren Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling (1843) is foundational for later existentialist thought because it centers the individual’s inner life and ethical struggle. Key themes:

• Subjectivity: Kierkegaard argues that truth is lived, not merely objectively known. The “knight of faith” embodies a subjective relation to God that suspends universal ethical norms; authentic religious truth is inward, passionately appropriated rather than abstractly demonstrated. (See: “subjectivity is truth” in Kierkegaard’s wider corpus.)

• Anxiety: The text dramatizes existential anxiety as the cost of absolute inward commitment. Abraham’s readiness to sacrifice Isaac provokes dread and paradox—anxiety that arises when the finite self confronts an absolute demand that undermines ordinary understanding and security.

• Despair: While not labeled the same way as in The Sickness Unto Death, Fear and Trembling explores despair’s forms: despair over losing conventional ethical bearings, and despair that can accompany the isolation of inward faith. The work highlights the psychic strain when one’s responsibility to the absolute isolates one from communal norms.

• Authenticity: Kierkegaard champions a lived, singular fidelity (the authentic self) over conformity to public ethical systems. Authenticity here means embracing the tension between the universal and the particular—the individual’s teleological suspension of the ethical—accepting paradox rather than dissolving it into rationalization.

Together these elements make Fear and Trembling a cornerstone for existentialism’s focus on individual choice, moral paradox, and the psychological depths of faith and freedom. Recommended secondary sources: Walter Lowrie’s translation/introduction and Jean-Paul Sartre’s discussions of existential subjectivity.

Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling uses the biblical story of Abraham and Isaac to pose enduring ethical-theological questions. Central is the tension between two moral perspectives:

• Divine command vs. universal ethics: Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice Isaac illustrates obedience to God that appears to contravene universal moral laws (don’t kill). Kierkegaard asks whether an absolute duty to God can legitimately override ethical norms grounded in reason or the community.

• Conscience as existential, singular commitment: Kierkegaard distinguishes between the “ethical” (the realm of universal duties, public norms, and rational moral reasoning) and the “religious” or “teleological suspension of the ethical,” where the individual’s direct relationship to God and subjective faith can justify actions that reason condemns. Conscience for Kierkegaard is not merely following generalized moral rules but involves a passionate, personal relation to the divine that may conflict with ethics.

• Limits of moral reasoning: The text challenges confidence in an ethics reducible to rational principles or social duties. Some situations—the “teleological suspension” Abraham embodies—expose the limits of applying universal principles; faith can place one beyond the calculable reach of ethical justification.

Kierkegaard doesn’t provide neat resolutions; instead he dramatizes a paradox: true faith can look like moral transgression yet remains subjectively justified before God. This raises ongoing questions for ethics and theology about obedience, authority, autonomy, and whether any moral system can fully account for singular, transcendent claims.

For further reading: S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling (1843); secondary: H. V. Hong & E. H. Hong (trans.), and secondary discussions in Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue.

Kierkegaard’s central claim is that genuine faith is paradoxical because it can require suspending the ethical — the universal moral law that governs human relations — in order to obey a higher, absolute duty to God. The ethical (represented by universal norms and rational duties) binds everyone equally; it is the sphere of the citizen, the moral conscience, and human reason. Faith, however, is a singular, personal relationship to God that can place the individual beyond the public ethical order.

Abraham is Kierkegaard’s exemplar — the “knight of faith.” When God commands Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, Abraham faces a conflict between two authorities: the ethical duty not to kill his son (a universal moral claim) and the divine command that seems to require exactly that killing. Abraham’s response shows the paradox: he does not reject the ethical abstractly, but he temporarily “suspends” it as the supreme duty to God requires. This suspension is not a mere violation or absence of ethics; it is a movement into the domain of the absolute — an act of faith that trusts God’s goodness and promise beyond rational justification.

Kierkegaard stresses that this suspension is deeply lonely and inward: the paradox of faith cannot be resolved by public reason, communal norms, or ethical discourse. The “knight of faith” acts in absolute duty to God while still bearing the anguish of appearing absurd to others. Thus faith is both a higher obedience and an existential tension: it transcends the universal while remaining deeply personal and nontransferable.

Reference: Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling (especially the “Problemata” and the “Equivocal” readings of the Abraham story).

Kierkegaard opens Fear and Trembling by framing a paradox: how can a single individual—Abraham—be both the hero of faith and, from an ethical or universal viewpoint, a murderer? The “Problem” names this conflict between the ethical (the universal moral law that forbids murder) and the religious (the particular relationship to God that commands Abraham to sacrifice Isaac). Kierkegaard stresses that the paradox is not merely intellectual but existential: how does one reconcile absolute duty to God with universal ethical duty? The “Problem” sets up the central question of whether faith can justify suspending the ethical.

The “Exordium” (the introduction to Abraham’s trial) narrows the focus and establishes Kierkegaard’s method: he treats the Abraham story as a lived, solitary trial rather than a myth or abstract case. He cautions against trying to rationalize Abraham’s deed by general rules or pitying explanations. Instead he emphasizes contemplation of Abraham’s inward anguish—the “fear and trembling” of a person faced with an impossible command—and the way faith makes the single individual stand before God “in solitude.” Kierkegaard introduces the idea of the “teleological suspension of the ethical”: Abraham’s willingness to obey God suspends the universal ethical for the sake of a higher teleology (God’s purpose). The Exordium thus prepares readers to consider faith as a paradoxical, subjective relation that cannot be subsumed under objective ethics or conventional heroism.

Key points to remember

• The Problem: tension between universal ethics and absolute duty to God—can faith justify suspending the ethical?
• The Exordium: presents Abraham’s test as an existential, solitary trial; introduces themes of inwardness, paradox, and the teleological suspension of the ethical.
• Kierkegaard’s aim: to move from abstract reflection to a passionate, subjective engagement with what faith demands.

For further reading: see Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling (1843), especially the Prefaces and “A” [Johannes de silentio]’s opening sections.

Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous author (Johannes de Silentio) deliberately adopts irony and humour to avoid offering neat doctrinal answers. Rather than instructing the reader what to believe or how to act, the voice stages paradoxes, wry remarks, and ironic contrasts that unsettle ordinary moral and rational certainties. This indirect method has two key effects:

• It displaces argument into reflection. Irony breaks the reader’s complacency by making familiar categories (duty, faith, reason) look unstable or inadequate. In doing so it pushes the reader to confront the inner tension between ethical universality and the singular demand of faith exemplified by Abraham.

• It preserves subjectivity and responsibility. By refusing to hand down conclusions, the pseudonym forces readers to appropriate the existential choice themselves. Humour often softens the blow, opening a space in which the reader can acknowledge absurdity or paradox without being lectured, thereby making genuine inwardness and decision more likely.

In short, irony and humour function not as mere stylistic play but as ethical devices: they provoke self-examination, resist doctrinal closure, and demand that the reader personally reckon with the paradox of faith.

Suggested reading: Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling (Johannes de Silentio). For commentary on indirect communication, see Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments and Alastair Hannay’s introductions.

Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling stages the Abraham story to challenge the ethical as conceived by Hegel and to provoke later debates about faith and morality. Two key strands to note:

1. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (the universal/ethical)

• Hegel treats ethical life (Sittlichkeit) as the unfolding of rational freedom in social institutions (family, civil society, state). Morality is realized in universal norms and duties that reconcile individual particularity with the common good.
• Against this background, Kierkegaard’s “teleological suspension of the ethical” is radical: the individual relation to God (faith) can place the absolute command of God above universal ethical norms. Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice Isaac represents a single individual’s absolute duty to God that violates universal ethical duties (a father’s duty to his son, laws protecting life).
• The tension: Hegel would see the ethical as higher than idiosyncratic exceptions; Kierkegaard insists that true faith may require a paradoxical, nonmediated relation to the absolute that suspends the universal without dissolving it into arbitrary subjectivity.

2. Contemporary discussions on faith and morality (e.g., D. Z. Phillips)

• D. Z. Phillips and other postwar philosophers of religion critique readings that make Kierkegaard endorse irrationalism or moral relativism. Phillips emphasizes careful conceptual analysis of religious language and moral claims.
• Phillips resists the idea that faith simply overrides ethics. Instead he often stresses that religious commitments have their own internal rationality and that apparent conflicts between faith and morality need closer attention to meaning, context, and the lived practices of believers.
• In this spirit, contemporary debates ask: does Kierkegaard’s figure of Abraham show that faith is beyond reason, or that faith reconfigTitle: Kierkegaard, Hegel, and Contemporary Debates on Faith and Morality

Short explanation: In Fear and Trembling Kierkegaard stages a critique of Hegelian ethics by contrasting the “universal” ethical order with the singularity of faith. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right treats moral life (Sittlichkeit) as an objective, rational social whole in which individuals realize freedom by conforming to universal norms—laws, family, civil society, and the state. For Hegel, ethical action is intelligible and justified within this universal framework; exceptions are anomalies to be resolved by the system’s rational development.

Kierkegaard rejects the idea that faith can be fully subsumed under the universal. Using the Abraham story, he argues that authentic religious faith may demand a “teleological suspension of the ethical”: the individual’s relation to God can place them above (or against) universal moral duties. Faith is a paradoxical, inward, personal relation that cannot be rationally mediated by social ethics without losing its immediacy and responsibility before God. Kierkegaard thus defends the priority of the singular existential relation over abstract ethical universality.

Contemporary resonance — D. Z. Phillips and others: Contemporary philosophers of religion such as D. Z. Phillips engage this tension while resisting both uncritical fideism and reduction of religion to ethics. Phillips emphasizes the distinctiveness of religious language and practice: moral discourse and religious discourse operate with different uses, standards, and responsibilities. He critiques readings that either make religion an ethical subspecies or that isolate it as irrational. For Phillips, like Kierkegaard, the religious is not merely another set of ethical prescriptions; it involves forms of life and ways of speaking that must be understood on their own terms. However, Phillips is careful to avoid endorsing a wholesale “suspension” of ethics; instead he invites careful attention to how religious commitments shape moral reasoning without collapsing one into the other.

Key takeaway: Kierkegaard challenges Hegel’s universalist ethical model by insisting on the irreducible singularity of faith. Contemporary thinkers like D. Z. Phillips continue the conversation by exploring how religious faith and moral norms relate—acknowledging distinct registers without necessarily endorsing a simple escape from ethical accountability.

Suggested sources:

• S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling (1843).
• G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1820).
• D. Z. Phillips, Religion and Moral Philosophy (and related essays).

Kierkegaard’s “teleological suspension of the ethical” (in Fear and Trembling) describes Abraham’s willingness to suspend general ethical norms (murder) for a higher, divine purpose. This raises a real worry: could Kierkegaard’s idea be read as endorsing religiously motivated immoral acts or as justifying fanaticism?

Brief explanation of the problem

• If an individual claims a divine command overrides universal ethical duties, ordinary moral checks (law, conscience, public ethics) could be bypassed. This risks endorsing harmful actions in the name of religion or “faith.”
• The tension is acute because Kierkegaard’s exemplar (Abraham) is presented not as a model to imitate mechanically but as a single, paradoxical “knight of faith.” Yet readers might misuse the concept to rationalize wrongdoing.

How Kierkegaard limits endorsement (contextual safeguards)

• Singularity and paradox: Kierkegaard emphasizes Abraham’s absolute solitude and paradoxical relation to God; the act is not a generalizable rule for communal life. It’s a singular, existential test, not a template.
• Interiority and anxiety: Genuine faith involves deep subjective struggle, anguish, and responsibility before God—not casual or triumphant claims. The anguish and “teleological suspension” are not comfortable justifications.
• Impossibility of public validation: Abraham cannot present his reason to others; faith transcends ethical publicity. This makes the claim to divine suspension nontransferable and noninstitutionalizable.
• Ethical rebound: Kierkegaard doesn’t abolish the ethical; he stages a tension. The ethical remains the universal norm for communal life; the “suspension” is an extreme, exceptional relation, not a political program.

Practical precautions to prevent abuse

• Demand demonstrable interior struggle: Treat any claim of divine exemption with skepticism unless accompanied by evident, profound personal conflict and humility rather than certainty and triumphalism.
• Preserve public ethical standards: Maintain law and shared moral norms as the default; exceptional claims cannot substitute social legal processes.
• Require evidentiary restraint: Religious claims that would harm others should be subjected to secular oversight (courts, medical ethics, etc.)—Kierkegaard gives no carte blanche for social disruption.
• Discourage generalized doctrine: Emphasize Kierkegaard’s point that the “teleological suspension” is not a doctrine to be taught as a norm; teach it as a paradox highlighting faith’s difficulty, not as authorization for action.
• Foster theological accountability: Religious communities should promote robust theological reflection and pastoral scrutiny to prevent charismatic leaders from claiming divine exemption.

References

• S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling (1843), especially the “Problemata” and “Eulogy on Abraham.”
• Stanley Cavell, “Kierkegaard and the Concept of Authority,” and contemporary discussions in political theology about the limits of religious exemption.

Summary Kierkegaard’s account illuminates faith’s paradox but does not, if read carefully, authorize generalized religiously motivated immorality. The text itself—and prudent ethical practice—requires treating any claim to divine suspension as singular, intensely private, non-transferable, and subject to communal legal and moral safeguards.

Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855), a Danish philosopher and theologian, published Fear and Trembling in 1843 under the pseudonym “Johannes de Silentio.” The work is a central text of Christian existentialism and a pointed critique of Hegelian ethical universalism.

Brief explanation:

• Pseudonym and stance: Writing as Johannes de Silentio lets Kierkegaard explore faith from the outsider’s anguished perspective. The pseudonymous voice highlights subjectivity, inwardness, and the existential difficulty of true faith.
• The narrative focus: The text meditates on the biblical story of Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice Isaac (the “binding” or akedah). Abraham’s act is treated as the paradigmatic moment of faith that suspends ordinary ethical norms.
• Critique of Hegel: Kierkegaard opposes Hegel’s view that ethical life is subsumed by universal rational norms and historical/systematic progress. He argues that faith can demand a leap beyond universal ethics — a “teleological suspension of the ethical” — that cannot be rationally justified by universal principles.
• Existential insight: True faith is intensely individual, paradoxical, and involves anxiety, solitude, and passion. Abraham is praised not for violating ethics lightly, but for an absolute relation to God that places him alone before the divine command.
• Method and tone: The book blends philosophical analysis, biblical interpretation, and literary voice; it emphasizes paradox, irony, and the limits of systematic thought when confronting the personal demand of faith.

Further reading:

• Kierkegaard, S. Fear and Trembling (1843). Translations and introductions by Walter Lowrie or Alastair Hannay are recommended.
• For context on Hegelian critique: Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self; and Hegel’s Philosophy of Right.

References: Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling; secondary literature on Kierkegaard’s existentialism and critique of Hegel.

Tension with Modern Secular Ethics and Human Rights

Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling presents the Abraham story as the exemplar of the “teleological suspension of the ethical”: the possibility that a higher divine command can legitimately override universal moral laws. This idea collides with the basic assumptions of modern secular ethics and human-rights frameworks in three key ways.

1. Universality vs. the singular

• Modern ethics and human-rights doctrines (Kantian deontology, utilitarianism, international human-rights law) treat moral duties and rights as universal, binding for all persons. Kierkegaard’s knight of faith is a singular individual whose relation to God can exempt him from universal duties. That privileging of the singular undermines the idea of impartial, public moral rules.

2. Rule of law and moral predictability

• Secular legal and rights systems rely on predictability: laws apply equally, protecting vulnerable persons against arbitrary commands. The teleological suspension allows apparently arbitrary, secret commands (God’s will) to justify actions that would otherwise be crimes or rights violations, threatening legal equality and accountability.

3. Priority of human dignity

• Human-rights discourse gives intrinsic worth to persons, forbidding instrumentalization (e.g., killing an innocent to fulfill a private command). Kierkegaard’s exemplar suggests that obedience to a transcendent relation can, in principle, instrumentally use another human if God so commands, which conflicts with the inviolability of human dignity central to rights rhetoric.

Still, Kierkegaard’s work is not a straightforward attack on ethics; it is a critique of abstract moralism. He emphasizes existential seriousness, the limits of ethical generalizations, and the demand that faith places on the individual conscience. Contemporary readers can take this as a reminder that ethical systems risk dehumanizing the singular subject if they ignore personal commitment and conscience—while also warning of the dangers when private claims to absolute authority override shared protections.

Further reading: Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling (1843); On the modern side: Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals; Hannah Arendt, “The Banality of Evil” (on law, judgment, and responsibility).

This selection points to three important secondary works for understanding Fear and Trembling and Kierkegaard’s account of faith:

• C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard: An Introduction (especially chapters on faith)

  • Why it’s useful: Evans offers a clear, sympathetic exposition of Kierkegaard’s thought, situating Fear and Trembling within Kierkegaard’s religious existentialism. His chapters on faith unpack key concepts—anxiety, the teleological suspension of the ethical, the knight of faith—and show how Kierkegaard means to reconceive faith not as assent to propositions but as a paradoxical, inward relation to God. Helpful for readers wanting careful conceptual and theological clarification. (See also Evans’s later works on Kierkegaard and Christian philosophy.)

• Alastair Hannay, Kierkegaard: A Biography

  • Why it’s useful: Hannay provides accessible biographical context. Fear and Trembling is best read against Kierkegaard’s life, his conflicts with the Danish church and public, and his preoccupation with individual responsibility. Hannay’s biography links the text’s pseudonymous voices and rhetorical strategies to Kierkegaard’s personal and historical situation, helping readers see why Kierkegaard stresses solitude, irony, and indirect communication.

• Jean Wahl, Kierkegaard and His Times

  • Why it’s useful: Wahl situates Kierkegaard within broader intellectual and cultural currents of 19th‑century Denmark and Europe. His study clarifies the philosophical background (Hegelianism, romanticism) and the theological controversies Kierkegaard was reacting to. This helps readers grasp Fear and Trembling as a critique of systematic ethics and of any view that reduces faith to ethical duty or rational comprehension.

Taken together: Evans supplies careful thematic and theological analysis of faith as Kierkegaard conceives it; Hannay supplies the biographical lens that explains Kierkegaard’s rhetorical strategies; Wahl supplies the historical-philosophical context that makes the text’s polemical targets intelligible. Using all three will give a balanced understanding of Fear and Trembling’s ideas, motives, and historical significance.

References:

• Evans, C. Stephen. Kierkegaard: An Introduction. (See chapters on faith.)
• Hannay, Alastair. Kierkegaard: A Biography.
• Wahl, Jean. Kierkegaard and His Times.

Kierkegaard’s “absurd” names the collision between two ways of understanding reality: reason (the universal, ethical, and empirical) and faith (the particular, religious relation to God). In Fear and Trembling he argues that true Abrahamic faith accepts a divine command that appears absurd to reason — for example, Abraham’s belief that Isaac would be restored even after being commanded to sacrifice him. Reason sees only contradiction or injustice: promising descendants through Isaac yet sacrificing him; moral law forbids murder. Faith, by contrast, trusts the absolute God and lives in the tension of the paradox: it receives what reason calls impossible or absurd.

This “absurd” is not irrational caprice but a specific theological paradox: the single individual’s relation to God suspends universal ethical expectations (the “teleological suspension of the ethical”) and rests on a personal, inward assurance that what God has promised will be fulfilled despite appearances. Faith thereby affirms the particular divine possibility that transcends human logic. (See Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, especially the “Problemata” and “Eulogy on Abraham”.)

Subjectivity and Inwardness in Fear and Trembling

Kierkegaard argues that true faith is not a matter of objective demonstration or universal ethical reasoning but an intensely personal, inward relation to God. For him, what makes belief authentic is not conformity to external proofs or communal norms but the individual’s passionate, sincere inwardness—how one exists before God. This means faith involves a “teleological suspension of the ethical” (the Abraham story): the believer may be called beyond universal moral duties because the relation to God is higher than ethical universality. That relation cannot be verified by objective criteria; it is lived and risked subjectively.

Key points:

• Subjectivity over objectivity: Rational arguments or empirical evidence cannot capture the existential reality of faith. Kierkegaard famously writes that “truth is subjectivity”: the truth that matters in religion is how genuinely and passionately one stands in relation to the divine.
• Inwardness: Faith is interior — a movement of the self toward God, involving anxiety, passion, and commitment. It requires the whole person, not detached assent.
• Paradox and passion: Faith may appear absurd or paradoxical to external reason (e.g., Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice Isaac), but its authenticity is shown in the believer’s willing passion and trust in God rather than in logical justification.
• Individual responsibility: Each person must make the inward choice; faith cannot be delegated or proven for someone else. Sincerity and existential appropriation are decisive.

Relevant sources: Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling (especially the sections on “Faith as the Teleological Suspension of the Ethical” and “Problemata” discussing subjectivity). Also Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers where he emphasizes “subjectivity is truth.”

Kierkegaard deliberately writes indirectly—using pseudonyms, parables, irony, and layered authorship—to force readers into active interpretation rather than passive absorption. In Fear and Trembling this produces intrinsic ambiguity: the narrator’s voice, the pseudonymous “Johannes de Silentio,” and the use of biblical story (Abraham and Isaac) are not transparent conveyors of a single doctrine but instruments that confront the reader with existential tension.

Why this matters:

• Multiple perspectives: The text presents conflicting positions (ethical universal vs. religious exception) without settling them, so the reader must wrestle with the paradox instead of receiving a neat argument.
• Existential demand: Ambiguity makes the reader responsible for making the “leap” to appropriation; understanding is not merely intellectual but a lived, subjective choice.
• Resistant to systematization: The indirect method blocks easy philosophical or theological co-optation; the work resists being reduced to propositions or a single moral lesson.

Reference: See Kierkegaard’s prefaces and pseudonymous works for his theory of indirect communication; primary text: S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling (1843).

Kierkegaard’s phrase “teleological suspension of the ethical” (Fear and Trembling) names a specific paradox: faith can authorize an individual to obey a higher purpose (telos) — God’s command — even when that command appears to violate universal ethical duties. “Teleological” points to an ultimate goal or end; “suspension” means ethical norms are set aside, not abolished.

Key points, briefly:

• Ethical as universal: For Kierkegaard (via his pseudonym Judge Wilhelm), the ethical represents the universal moral law — duties we owe to others and to ourselves (e.g., don’t commit murder).
• Teleology/Higher end: Faith orients a person toward a higher end — the divine will or relation to God — which can supersede the ethical when God’s command demands something paradoxical.
• Not nihilism: This suspension is not meaninglessness or lawlessness. It is a relation to the absolute (God). The individual remains deeply responsible before God even while exempt from the universal ethical order.
• The Abraham example: Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice Isaac illustrates the paradox: ethically reprehensible (murder), yet faith’s obedience to God makes Abraham “righteous.” His act is justified only through his personal relation to the absolute, not by universal ethical standards.
• The existential risk: Kierkegaard stresses this is a lonely, anguishing position — faith is not a simple loophole but a tragic, paradoxical commitment that cannot be systematized or generalized.

Reference: Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling (1843), esp. “A” (the philosophical problem) and the “Judge” sections on the teleological suspension of the ethical.

In Fear and Trembling Kierkegaard contrasts two figures to show different ways an individual can confront duty and sacrifice.

• The tragic hero (e.g., Agamemnon) acts on behalf of the universal — the ethical, the community, the law. His sacrifice is grounded in a recognized, shareable norm: he gives up his child for the good of the nation. Because his motive is the universal, his deed is intelligible and praise‑ or blame‑worthy within ethical discourse. The tragic hero elevates the particular to the service of the universal, and his conflict is resolved by appeal to public reason and moral law.

• The knight of faith (e.g., Abraham) operates in an absolute relation to the absolute — a direct relation to God that suspends the ethical. His apparent action (willing to sacrifice Isaac) cannot be justified by universal norms; it is rooted in faith, not ethical universality. To others the knight’s action appears absurd or tragic; it is unintelligible within the ethical because it bypasses the universal in favor of a singular divine command. The knight retains full inwardness and trust (faith) while performing what the ethical would condemn; his reconciliation is personal and religious, not publicly rational.

Key point: The tragic hero’s deed can be comprehended, judged, and integrated into the ethical order; the knight of faith’s deed is a paradox — it makes sense only within faith’s relation to God and remains opaque, even scandalous, to ethical reason. Kierkegaard uses this contrast to stress that true religious faith may require a “teleological suspension of the ethical” — a leap beyond universal morality into a personal relation with the absolute. (See Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, especially the “Eulogy on Abraham” and the “Problemata” sections.)